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ABSTRACT 
We find that UK firms are increasingly having fewer board meetings mainly because of the 
significant increase in the proportion of foreign non-executive directors on the board. The 
combination of low meetings frequency and the presence of foreign non-executive directors is 
correlated with lower total shareholder returns and increases the agency conflicts through 
excess compensations of the CEO and chairman, which are not related to firm value creation. 
Our results suggest that a trade-off between increased board diversity coupled with reduced 
monitoring through fewer meetings, weakens the internal governance mechanism, reduces the 
advisory role benefits of foreign non-executive directors who are likely to possess international 
expertise, and exacerbates significantly the agency conflicts.  
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Impact of Foreign Directors on Board Meeting Frequency 
 
1. Introduction 
The 1999 annual report of Marconi PLC p. 35 noted that (our underlining):  
“The non-executive Directors meet with the Chairman and Chief Executive at least once a year 
to discuss a wide range of matters affecting the Company.”  
While the 2000 annual report p. 36 noted that:  
“The non-executive Directors meet with the Chairman and Chief Executive at least twice a year 
to discuss a wide range of matters affecting the Company…”1   
How frequently should the board of directors meet, and does board diversity, 
particularly the presence of foreign non-executive directors, reduce this frequency and 
exacerbate the agency conflicts? These questions are topical, controversial, and have policy 
implications, yet, they are not directly covered by governance codes and the past literature. For 
example, the UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003) provides substantial 
guidance for the activities and procedures of boards of directors and their committees (i.e. what 
they do at meetings), but does not state how often they should meet and how diverse they should 
be.2 Even though board meetings are fundamental for directors to obtain information, 
participate in decision making, avoid personal liability, and perform their monitoring and 
advisory roles (Adams and Ferriera, 2012), previous studies use board meetings frequency 
mainly to proxy for strategic control (Vafeas, 1999), board workload (Linck et al., 2008) or 
                                                 
1 In 1998-2000, General Electric Company PLC, one of the twenty largest listed firms in the UK, sold its largest 
revenue and profit generating businesses, primarily in the defence industry, made many speculative acquisitions, 
adding to its existing telecom and technology businesses, and renamed itself Marconi plc. It defaulted in 2001.  
2 Technically, this code advises that “The board should meet sufficiently regularly to discharge its duties 
effectively” (p 5). In contrast, in France, Vienot (1995) notes that “…where no special circumstances arise four to 
six [full board] meetings should be sufficient (p.18)”. 
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board vigilance in the presence of activist shareholders (Cohn and Rajan, 2013).3 For board 
diversity, the focus was more on gender; it is only recently that the impact of foreign directors 
is considered (Masulis et al., 2012).4  
We contribute to the literature by documenting trends in board meetings and by 
assessing the impact of foreign non-executive directors on their frequency. We hand collect 
extensive data on board composition, demographics, remuneration, and meetings frequency, 
for a sample of 241 UK firms with complete data from 1999 to 2012.5 We focus mainly on the 
impact of foreign directors which we expect to contribute to the board effectiveness through 
their advice, as is shown for, say, Chinese firms whose performance increases due to foreign 
directors’ experience and knowledge transfer relating to management practices and corporate 
governance (Giannetti et al., 2015). However, they are likely to limit the board meeting 
frequency because of the relatively higher costs involved. It is also easier and cheaper to attract 
local directors who are more likely to have relatively more time and energy to travel cheaply to 
board meetings and oversee firm developments, and firms have better access to soft information 
about their availability (Knyazeva et al., 2013). These arguments imply that firms are likely to 
trade-off the costs and benefits when recruiting foreign directors. 
Our main results can be summarised as follows: We find that the average number of 
meetings decreased significantly over our sample period, from 9.33 in 1999 to 8.33 in 2012. In 
                                                 
3Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2013) show that boards in Israel spend their time predominantly monitoring the 
management. Brickley and Zimmerman (2010) show advice and monitoring can be performed simultaneously in 
the case of capex and dividend decisions, but the monitoring role is more likely to predominate in other decisions 
such as executive compensation, financial reporting, and CEO retention/dismissal. Merchant and Pick (2010) 
suggest that an effective board meeting should involve disagreement among the directors to encourage critical 
thinking. Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Harris and Raviv (2008) provide the theoretical models and Boone, et 
al., (2007), Coles, et al., (2008), Linck, et al. (2008), and Lehn, et al., (2009) the empirical evidence.   
4 See also Daniel, et al., (2013); Miletkov, et al., (2013); Oxelheim, et al., (2013). 
5 We focus on UK where corporate governance is much stricter than the US. For example, compared to Masulis et 
al. (2012), UK firms are more likely to split the roles of their CEO and chairman, to have a higher proportion of 
foreign directors (27% vs. 18%), and foreign non-executive directors (73% vs.13%). Unfortunately, we are unable 
to identify the nationality of foreign directors, or to separate affiliated from independent directors.  
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the post-financial crisis period, the median meetings decreased from 9 to 8, when meetings 
should increase given the relatively higher level of uncertainly and complexity. We report that 
the proportion of non-executive directors that are foreign nationals exerts a strong negative 
impact on the board meeting frequency. For example, we show that, as the number of meetings 
increases, the mean proportion of foreign directors decreases from about 37% to 20%. Boards 
with no foreign non-executive directors meets 9.23 time per year, compared to 7.59 times for 
firms with more than 75% foreign non-executive directors. Yet boards with foreign non-
executive directors are in firms with greater international operations and complexity.   
Our results appear to suggest that board meeting frequency is becoming more 
standardised and potentially more bureaucratic, as it is less idiosyncratic to the firm, and 
seemingly determined as a more convenient or publicly acceptable number. The boards of 
directors that do not adapt their meetings to firm needs cannot be providing their non-executive 
directors the optimum opportunity to exercise their monitoring responsibilities. In line with 
these arguments, we find that, unlike Vafaes (1999), shareholder value creation is not affected 
by the meetings frequency, but, in line with Miletkov et al. (2013), it is negatively affected by 
the proportion of foreign non-executive directors. However, our key result is that the 
combination of meetings frequency and the proportion of non-executive directors affects 
positively firm value, suggesting that firms benefits from the presence of foreign directors when 
they meet more frequently. However, we show that this combination doesn’t necessarily 
reduces the agency conflicts by aligning compensation and performance. We show that when 
the proportion of foreign non-executive directors is high and/or their meetings frequency is low, 
firms have significantly higher excess compensation of their CEO, independently of the firm’s 
performance. The presence of foreign non-executive directors increases also significantly the 
compensation of the chairmen of the boards, but the frequency of meetings is not significant, 
suggesting that, inconsistent with Adams and Ferriera (2012) in the case of non-executive 
directors, they are not incentivised to attend board meetings.  
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We find a higher proportion of foreign non-executive directors in firms with complex 
structures as measured by size and foreign operations, but surprisingly, not risky firms with 
high standard deviation of ROA. However, the total compensation of the CEO and chairman in 
these firms is also likely to be higher, and not related to firm performance, in line with Masulis 
et al. (2012). We conclude that foreign non-executive directors affect meeting frequencies and 
do not necessarily allow, or, at best, limit or weaken the monitoring role of the board, which 
lapses in governing firm financial resources and in reviewing the performance of managers.  
In line with previous evidence, we find that firm’s operating performance influences its 
board meeting frequency. Consistent with Vafeas (1999), we show that more profitable firms 
tend to meet less frequently. We use a natural experiment to explore the possibility that board 
meetings and foreign non-executive directors are endogenously determined by focussing on the 
impact of the 2007 financial crisis. We find that, after accounting for governance and firms’ 
fundamental factors, this crisis did not affect the board meetings frequency. However, when the 
reporting and disclosure requirement of meetings came into effect in 2003, the median meeting 
frequency has actually decreased from 9 to 8 (p = 0.00), while the proportion of foreign non-
executive directors increased from 24% to 33% (p = 0.00). The relationship between board 
meetings and foreign non-executive directors is strongly negative in both periods. We use fixed 
effects models to show that, after controlling for other firm specific factors, this proportion of 
foreign non-executive directors is negative in all our specifications.  
Our study contributes to the on-going and large debate on the design and effectiveness 
of the board of directors. We consider that outside directors have higher information acquisition 
costs, are more likely to be dependent on the CEO for their information, and their incentives to 
monitor may be weaker (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983; Harris and Raviv, 2008; Kumar and 
Sivaramakrishnan, 2008).6 In line with Masulis et al. (2012), we argue that foreign non-
                                                 
6 Empirically, firms weigh the costs and benefits of outside directors in structuring their boards according to their 
monitoring and advising needs (e.g., Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al., 2008). Duchin et al. (2010) 
find that the cost of information acquisition is critical in efficient boards, as the firm’s performance increases 
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executive directors may help companies gain more expertise, and bring new breadth and culture 
to local boards. However, they raise concerns as to how their geographical location, different 
backgrounds and, in some cases, linguistics, affect board balance and behaviour, namely its 
meeting frequency. We find that since foreign non-executive directors are predominant in firms 
with overseas operations, their advisory role is likely to be important. Nonetheless, when they 
lead to low board meeting frequency, the information costs become high, the board becomes 
less effectiveness, and the advisory benefits are wiped out. However, while Masulis et al. (2012) 
find that foreign non-executive directors display poor board meetings attendance, we find that 
they are associated with low number of meetings frequency, which may be more costly, as the 
CEOs may find excuses not to call a board meeting with the domestic board members, under 
the pretext that their foreign counterparts may not attend.  
Brick and Chidambaran (2010) find a positive relationship between board meetings and 
firm value, and emphasise the concept that increases in meeting frequencies represent a rise in 
the level of monitoring (as opposed to a rise in advisory activity).7 We show that foreign 
directors reduce board’s meetings, and, thus, its monitoring role. Alam et al. (2014) report that 
local independent directors reduce CEO pay but weaken turnover-performance sensitivity. On 
the other hand, Wan (2008) shows that although local independent directors are better informed, 
they are less effective as monitors, possibly because of greater social dependence. We find that 
foreign non-executive directors lead to higher compensation, implying that local non-executive 
directors strengthen the boards of directors’ activity in exerting control over management for 
the benefit of shareholders. Overall, our results support the managerial power theory of the 
board of directors being manipulated to the advantage of management through the presence of 
foreign non-executive directors. 
                                                 
(decreases) when outsiders are added to the board as the information acquisition costs are low (high). See Bebchuk 
and Weisbach (2010) Agrawal and Knoeber (2012) and Adams, et al. (2010) for reviews. 
7 Lorsch and MacIver’s (1989) survey and case-based study of US boards in the 1980s shows that boards of 
directors increased their meeting frequency in times of crises and major challenges. 
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical 
framework of boards of directors and the determinants of meeting frequency. Section 3 presents 
the data and methodology. Section 4 reports the results. Conclusions are in Section 5. 
 
2.  Theoretical background  
“Every company should be headed by an effective board, which is collectively 
responsible for the success of the company” is the first line of the UK Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance (2003). In addition, boards are subject to a number of legal obligations, 
such as the requirement to file financial statements and decide on investment, financing and 
dividend decisions. The theoretical underpinnings highlighting the key role of the boards of 
directors in modern corporations have transitioned from the fiduciary role (Berle and Means, 
1932), to agency conflicts (Fama and Jensen, 1983), and then to the question as to whether they 
serve shareholders at all (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). 
Previous studies have not fully explored how boards function, and directors commit 
their time and efforts, and make decisions, primarily because board meetings are confidential.  
The literature is broad and deep, and the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of boards is 
relatively mixed (John and Senbet, 1998). How boards execute their responsibilities is largely 
theoretical, focussing mainly to the trade-off between the board’s roles as monitor and advisor 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Adams, 2000). A significant gap in the literature is the absence of 
an empirical assessment of the functioning of the boards, particularly the frequency of the board 
meetings, and its diversity in terms of the location of the non-executive directors. 
In the pre-1990s, non-executive directors could only have received information by 
telephone or in hard copy before or between meetings. By the 1990s, it was easier and 
assumable that director briefings were more continual, and perhaps digital. There is no 
theoretical basis to suggest that such increased communication affects the required amount of 
board meetings. Indeed, non-executive directors may perceive such flows of information as 
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requiring additional time commitment and may, accordingly, resist increased board meetings 
as a time management tool.8 The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003) instructs 
that UK non-executive directors should receive a letter, which explicitly states that they have a 
contract for services for a specifically indicated number of committed days, and expected full 
board meeting attendance, with the implication that the board commitment is less of a flexible 
responsive position than a bureaucratic commitment.  
The board of directors is the apex of corporate governance, and its members visibly 
exercise governance at board meetings. Without any guidance or instruction from external 
sources, the number of board meetings selected by a firm may appear to be a random event as 
boards chose different meeting frequencies. The pertinent question is to define the factors that 
influence the number of meetings. We follow Vafeas (1999), Adams (2005) and Brick and 
Chidambaran (2010) and identify the potential determinants that, under the agency framework, 
are expected to affect the board meetings’ frequency. We contribute to the literature by 
assessing the impact of key human dimensions, such as the international composition of the 
board and remuneration, which the literature has to-date overlooked. We expect the frequency 
of board of directors meetings to be a function of the following firm specific factors, namely, 
remuneration, firm performance, complexity, financial distress, and corporate governance.  
 
A. Remuneration 
Agency theory suggests that non-executive directors are expected to exert control over 
executive directors through the board of directors’ process, or simply by being board members. 
The governance requirements demand much of the board in setting and monitoring 
remuneration, suggesting that, boards with higher paid chairmen and CEOs are expected to 
meet more often to review various remuneration packages. The contracting theory states that 
                                                 
8 See Adams and Ferreira (2007) for a theoretical discussion of information trading amongst executive and non-
executive directors. 
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the chairmen and CEOs, when provided with higher pay packages, are encouraged to disclose 
more information to the non-executive directors (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Adams and 
Ferreira, 2007). These arguments imply a positive relationship between meetings and CEO pay. 
Similarly, on the basis of economic theory and incentive remuneration that individuals work 
more for more pay, higher paid chairman is expected to have more (or demand more) meetings. 
While we expect a positive link between CEO remuneration and firm performance, chairmen 
and non-executive directors in UK are almost universally cash-fee remunerated, based mainly 
upon time provided to the firm (Greenbury, 1995). Overall, we expect the remuneration of the 
board members to be positively related to the board meeting frequency. 
 
B. Firm Performance 
The agency, stewardship, and contracting theories suggest that board meeting frequency 
is correlated with challenges. Firm earnings (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) and market 
performance, or investor issues, are expected to influence boards of directors to act, and such 
action may increase, or decrease, their meeting frequency (Vafeas, 1999). Weakening firm 
dynamics may require immediate board consent or approval on key strategic issues, and non-
executive directors may realize an immediate risk to their professional reputations all 
demanding increased full board meetings.9  
However, previous studies on corporate governance and firm performance provide 
mixed evidence (see Bhagat and Black (2002) for board composition, and Gompers et al. (2003) 
for structural and legal influences). There is also a limited research on the link between board 
meetings and performance. Vafeas (1999) and Adams (2005) address this issue to find an 
inverse relationship between board meetings and prior performance. They argue that firm’s 
performance is an important determinant of board activity, as poor prior performance increases 
                                                 
9 In the US, Gilson (1990) and Kaplan and Reishus (1990) find that directors of distressed firms were not as likely 
to obtain subsequent directors positions.  
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the need for monitoring to turn around the firm. Boards are also likely to face increased pressure 
to be seen as being engaged when the firm is in financial distress, as creditors require meetings 
of the board, or with the board.10  
Overall, we expect a positive relationship between financial stress and board meeting 
frequency in line with agency and stewardship theories. However, our main challenge is the 
time frame appropriate for such an examination and the bi-polarity of the dual roles of boards. 
Boards may choose to meet more often in a given year to review major strategic opportunities 
with long-term impacts, or do they increase their meetings to react to current monitoring 
challenges. We use various variables to stratify across these effects. 
 
C. Firm Complexity 
Agency and contracting theories suggest that firms with more challenging business 
tasks, or complex structures, have greater advisory and monitoring needs (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 2001; Coles et al., 2008). Brick and Chidambaran (2010) find a positive relationship 
between board meetings and industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q, suggesting that board advising and 
monitoring activity increases as the level of investment opportunities increases.11 These results 
suggest that firms with greater scale, more diversified activities, and/or larger staff are likely to 
have more monitoring and advisory needs and require more board meetings.12  
In addition, we expect the severity of agency problems and the need for the board’s role 
as an advisor rather than a monitor to affect board meetings, and managers will disclose an 
optimal amount of information to maximise the advisory role and to minimise the monitoring 
                                                 
10 Firm stress measured by leverage is different from firm distress (or the firms experiencing declining 
performance) which is addressed within the firm performance variable.  
11 However, the relationship is stronger when they use a combined variable of the number of meetings and number 
of non-executive directors. 
12 Such factors may be misleading as large and international firm may have a limited business activity, while those 
with many employees may be in less complex activities. 
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role of the board.13 Adams (2000) models these two roles. She argues that the better the 
information provided by the CEO, the higher the benefits from the board’s advice, but the 
higher the costs from the increase in the board’s monitoring. Her model predicts that the board 
is likely to choose to pre-commit to reduce its monitoring of managers to encourage them to 
share their information. Therefore, when the value of communication is high, the board will 
reduce its monitor intensity, and managers will opt for a large number of meetings.  In contrast, 
when the advisory role of outside directors is not likely to be substantial, as decisions are not 
complex and the information is relatively easily accessible, the board of directors is likely to 
spend more time monitoring managers. As a result, managers will opt for a lower number of 
meetings. In line with agency and stewardship theories, we expect a positive relationship 
between board meeting frequency and firm’s complexity. 
 
D. Corporate Governance 
Contrary to the agency theory, managerial power theory suggests that executive 
directors may select board members to facilitate executive control, circumventing monitoring 
and control by non-executive directors. For example, Kaufman, et al. (2005) discuss the 
selection of other US CEOs as non-executive directors to enhance executive remuneration, 
implying lower meeting frequency to reduce the monitoring role of non-executive directors.14 
The agency framework suggests that shareholders’ monitoring interests may be met with more 
diverse directors as some may provide special skills or experience, with some directors 
potentially offering more advisory ability, while others (e.g. accountants) will have more 
monitoring ability.  
                                                 
13 Jensen (1993) argues that board reacts too late and takes too long to affect major changes, as its effectiveness is 
limited by a lack of information provided by insiders. 
14 Bebchuk and Fried (2004) provide extensive evidence of US CEO compensation that suggests that managers 
control boards for their own benefits. 
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Previous studies focus on specific director groups and/or types of directors, or include 
director characteristics as independent variables, to examine firm performance or particular 
board decisions. For example, Ferris et al. (2003) and Fich and Shivdasani (2006) analyse 
busyness or multiple directorships, but find mixed results. A growing literature is devoted to 
examining the evolution of modern boards, including more diversified membership (Carter et 
al., 2003; Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004; Farrell et al., 2005).  
Other studies show that board member characteristics, such as age, influence board decisions 
(Core et al., 1999; Yermack, 2004), while professional background may affect financial 
decision-making (Kroszner et al., 2001; Helland et al., 2004; Dionne et al., 2005; Borokhovich 
et al., 2004). However, there is little evidence on how director demographics affect board’s own 
activities, specifically the frequency of its meetings.  
Previous studies analyse board independence within the context of corporate 
performance (e.g., Bhagat and Black, 2002; Coles et al., 2008). Conversely, the independence 
of directors can also affect the frequency of board meetings. For example, Raheja (2005) argues 
that insiders on the board are likely to facilitate the flow of information. However, in the 
presence of outside independent directors, the cost of information acquisition may increase. 
Vafeas (1999) and Raheja (2005) suggest that, as boards become more independent, their 
meeting frequency increases to reflect the need to access information by other channels and the 
increased efforts needed for information coordination. 
Managers may respond by increasing board size to lessen its monitoring. Yermack 
(1996) for US, and Lasfer (2006) for the UK, among others, suggest that larger boards do not 
or cannot monitor or control the agency problem as well as smaller boards. In general, the 
relationship between board size and firm value is negative, suggesting that larger boards 
exacerbate the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. The Combined Code of 
Corporate Governance (2003) suggests that larger boards are ‘unwieldy’. However, Vafeas 
(1999) finds a positive correlation between US board size and meeting frequency, implying a 
Page 13 of 44 
need for increased board education efforts and providing inefficiency. Due to the 
unquestionably higher level of international diversity of UK boards (compared to US), we 
expect negative effect of board size on meeting frequency simply because of greater travel 
burdens on directors. Overall, in line with the previous arguments on complexity, we expect the 
composition of the board to affect the demand by managers for meetings. However, we expect 
a negative relationship between board meetings and the presence of board members that are 
more likely to provide advice than monitoring.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
We construct our sample by selecting companies listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) from 1999 to 2012 that disclose information on board meetings, composition and 
remuneration. We collect by hand all board data from financial statements. The accounting and 
market data is extracted from DataStream. We exclude investment trusts but kept the remaining 
financial firms, except when we use leverage in our regressions. A number of firms consistently 
state that their board meets within a range (e.g. 6-8 times per year), or that the board meets at 
least a given number of times. In these instances, we use the average of the former and added 1 
to the latter consistently over the period in the belief that if a board did meet 4 or 10 times it 
would be seriously misleading to inform shareholders that it met materially more or less.  
Our final sample includes 241 UK firms with complete data, resulting in 1716 firm-year 
observations. Although our sample firms represent about 10% of all firms listed on the LSE in 
each year, they account for around 90% of the total market capitalisation. These firms are, thus, 
more likely to be international, visible in the investment community, most researched by 
financial analysts, have access to public capital markets, and are advised by domestic and 
foreign banks. The vast majority of them have headquarters within London to facilitate board 
and shareholder meetings and have high visibility in terms of their meetings, and compensation 
of their board members.  
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Our contribution is on the presence of foreign directors on the board, measured as the 
percentage of foreign non-executive directors (those listed as non-British in the annual reports) 
to total non-executive directors. We believe that using total foreign directors may be misleading 
as foreign executives would be more likely to be resident in the UK and may have similar 
attributes to British directors. In contrast, foreign non-executive directors are likely to live 
abroad and to come to the UK just to attend board meeting and to provide advice to the 
managers, given their higher knowledge of international markets, but their knowledge of local 
culture, corporate governance and accounting standards is likely to be lower. Their residential 
distance is likely to increase the costs of attending board meetings. 
To measure the impact of other corporate governance on board meeting frequency, we 
use board size, board independence,15 and a dummy for duality of the roles of the CEO and 
chairman. In the UK, these roles should be split. Jensen (1993) considers that the CEO cannot 
perform the function of the chairman, which is to run board meetings and oversee the process 
of hiring, firing, evaluating, and compensating the CEO efficiently. We also include the average 
age of executive and non-executive directors, and the average tenure of CEO, chairman and 
non-executive directors. We expect board size to be negatively related to board meetings, in 
line with the arguments of Yermack (1996) that larger boards exacerbate the agency conflicts. 
Similarly, we expect board meetings to be smaller, the older and the longer the tenure of the 
executive and non-executive directors, to reflect the board’s possible entrenchment or reduced 
independence. There is limited research on this issue. We note that the age of directors may 
signify entrenched interests, leading to a desire to circumvent monitoring efforts. Older boards 
will also meet less often as their monitoring role is lower (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003).  
                                                 
15 Board independence is the ratio of the non-executive directors, excluding the chairman, over total board 
members. We have not utilised the Combined Code of Corporate Governance (2003) definitions of independence 
for non-executive directors, as these would have been inappropriate for early years when a more liberal standard 
was accepted (Chambers, 2005). We do not include the chairman as a non-executive director following UK 
corporate governance convention. 
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For firm fundamental factors, we use Size, defined as the year-end market value of 
equity. We use the standard deviation of ROA over each firm’s sample period, as in Booth et 
al (2001), to measure business risk, and, thus, complexity. We use beta, computed by regressing 
firm’s stock returns on the Financial Times 100 Index in the previous 5 years. For non-financial 
firms we use leverage, defined as total debt to total assets to measure financial risk. We expect 
a positive relationship between all these variables and board meetings’ frequency.  
We use firms' market-to-book, MB, and price-to-earnings, PE ratios, as proxies for 
growth opportunities, to account for the severity of the agency problems.16 On the one hand, 
we expect a negative relationship between meetings’ frequency and growth because in high 
growth firms the role of the board is more of an advisor, rather than a monitor. In high growth 
firms agency problems are likely to be low (Jensen, 1986) and managers are expected to require 
strong advice from the board because of the complexity in their decision-making. At the same 
time, the behaviour of managers is difficult to observe and to monitor because of their 
discretionary investment opportunities, and the proprietary information they hold. Thus, the 
board is likely to opt for a friendly relationship with the management to obtain the information 
needed. We expect high growth firms to have a higher number of meetings to maximize the 
advisory benefits.  In contrast, in low growth firms, the advisory role of outside directors is not 
likely to be substantial as decisions are not complex and information is relatively easily 
accessible. In this case, the board of directors is likely to spend more time monitoring managers. 
From an agency perspective, low growth firms should have a high meetings frequency.  
We measure firm performance using accounting rates of return, such as return on assets, 
and total shareholder return, defined as annual stock returns plus dividends. We use three 
measures of remuneration. The first is the firm’s average non-executive director fee; this 
includes basic fees, committee fees, and attendance fees – but not advisory or consulting fees, 
                                                 
16 We find that PE and MB are not significantly correlated most likely due to historical goodwill write-off 
accounting and the minor representation of traditional tangible asset intensive firms compared to industrial sectors 
where earnings generation are based upon non-balance sheet recognised intangible assets. 
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if any. The second is the remuneration of the chairman, measured in line with that of the non-
executive directors. Finally, the remuneration of the CEO includes basic salaries, options, and 
bonuses, as disclosed in the annual account.  
We account for the year fixed effect by either using year dummies or two specific 
dummies. The first in Post-2007 to account for the impact of the financial crisis. The second is 
Post-2003 to capture the change in meeting disclosure regulation. In our regressions, we cluster 
the standard errors at the firm level to account for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of 
errors (Peterson, 2009). Finally, we report the variance inflation factor (VIF) to test for 
multicollinearity, which may be problematic as it increases the variance of the regression 
coefficients, making them unstable and difficult to interpret. It measures how much the variance 
of the estimated regression coefficients are inflated as compared to when the predictor variables 
are not linearly related. Values of 1 to 5 (above 5) indicate no or moderate (strong) correlation. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Univariate Analysis of Board Meetings 
Table 1 reports the annual and industry distributions of board meetings together with a 
sample of governance variables. Panel A. shows that the average (median) board meetings 
decreased relatively homogenously from 9.33 (10) in 1999 to 8.33 (8) in 2012. At the same 
time, the overall governance of our sample firms increased, as firms increased the proportion 
of non-executive directors from 48.8% to 60.8%, their board size decreased from 11.44 to 
10.52, and the proportion of firms that do not split the roles of the CEO and the chairman 
(Duality) decreased from 4.2% to 1.5%. The proportion of foreign non-executive directors 
increased from 18.3% to 37.4%, and that of foreign executive directors from 15.6% to 32.1%. 
These changes are also observed when we look at the medians. Figure 1 portrays the annual 
distribution of the number of meetings and the proportion of non-executive directors, foreign 
non-executive directors and foreign executive directors. 
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Panel B reports the industry distribution of the meetings. In line with Adams and 
Ferreira (2012) the governance of financial firms are more likely to be affected by regulation. 
Walker (2009) emphasised governance at financial institutions in the UK. Consistent with these 
effects, financial firms, together with other utilities which are regulated, have the highest board 
meetings frequency. However, firms in these sectors do not necessarily have a superior internal 
governance systems, as the proportion of non-executive directors, split of the roles, and foreign 
non-executives is not the highest. The two main sectors with majority foreign non-executive 
directors are health care (health care equipment and services and pharmaceutical and biotech 
industries) and basic materials (mainly chemicals and mining firms). 
[Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 here] 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the meeting frequencies, board 
characteristics, and the fundamental variables. We report the results for the sample as a whole, 
and for the pre- and post-2007 periods. The last two columns show the significance in 
differences in means and medians between the two periods.17 We also report the expected signs 
of the regression coefficients and the correlation, ρ, between Meetings and the proxy variables.  
Consistent with Fich and Shivdasani (2006), our results indicate that a typical firm has 
about 10 directors, 55% of whom are non-executives, and meets about 8 times a year. 
Surprisingly, the median number of meetings is statistically higher in the pre-2007. We find 
similar results when our cut-off date is 2003, when the reporting of meetings became 
compulsory. The correlation column indicates that the board meetings frequency is negatively 
related to some proxy variables that measure board entrenchment, including duality, tenure and 
age, but, also to the proportion of non-executive directors, profitability and growth. The 
correlation with size and leverage is not significant. Meeting frequency is positively related to 
equity beta, but negatively related to profitability (ROA), growth (MB and PE) and firm risk as 
                                                 
17 We do not report details results the pre- and post-2003 periods, in the latter period the disclosure of meetings is 
compulsory, but include a dummy variable in our regressions. 
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measured by the standard deviation of ROA. Since growth and risk reflect the firm’s 
complexity, our results suggest that firms that are more difficult to manage do not appear to 
have more board meetings.  
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics of selected explanatory variables split into 
board meetings frequency and proportion of foreign non-executive directors. Some results are 
portrayed in Figure 2. The last 2 rows of each panel show the p-values of the differences in 
means and medians between the first and the last group. Column (1) of Panel A. shows the 
frequency distribution of the annual number of board meetings. There are 35 cases where boards 
meet less than 4 times, increasing to 316 cases (18% of the total number of observations of 
1716) where they meet 8 times, and decreasing monotonically to 82 with 13 or more meetings.  
Columns (2) and (3) show that the frequency of meetings is relatively homogeneously 
distributed across board size and duality. However, column (4) indicates that firms with low 
number of meeting have relatively higher proportion of non-executive directors, but these 
directors are much more likely to be foreign than domestic, as shown in Column (5). Column 
(6) also indicates that these firms have a higher proportion of foreign (executive and non-
executive) directors, but Column (7) reports a smaller proportion of women on the board, which 
increases from 8.5% to 18.4%, when the meeting frequency increases from less than 4 to 13+. 
These results provide some early indication of the determinants of meetings’ frequency, 
particularly the negative impact of the presence of foreign directors. We find, but not report, 
similar results for firms that survived the whole sample period, suggesting that the impact of 
these variables on board meetings is not driven by the new companies that entered our sample. 
The impact of tenure and age of directors across board meeting is relatively weak. 
However, in terms of fundamental characteristics, Columns (13), (14) and (16) show that firms 
with low number of meetings are relatively smaller, generate low total shareholder returns and 
are more risky than firms with large number of meeting. Column (13) shows that the distribution 
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of firm value is not homogeneous across meeting. In particular, with the exception of the 
relatively smaller firms that appear to have 4 to 5 meetings, firms with 6 to 8 meetings are 
larger, but, although firms with 13+ meetings are larger than those with those that meet 4 to 5 
times a year, the relationship is not linear. Column (15) provides some weak evidence on the 
impact of growth as measured by market-to-book ratio. Although these results are consistent 
with the agency theory as these firms do not need monitoring, they do not provide support for 
the advisory role of the board. We find relatively similar results using price-to-earnings ratio. 
We also analyse, but do not report, the annual distribution of the results in Table 3. We 
find that the proportion of firms that held between 7 and 10 meetings increased from 45% in 
1999 to more than 60% in 2003-2012, suggesting that board meeting frequency became more 
standardised. The proportion of firms that held more than 9 meetings decreased from 52% in 
1999-2000 to 35% in 2007-2012. We find only about 26% of firms in 1999, and 12%, in the 
midst of the financial crisis of 2008, with 12 or more meetings. We also find that foreign 
directors held a mean 1.09 board seats in 1999 and 2.32 in 2012. While our results suggest that 
urgent meetings and information may be communicated electronically, they also imply that 
boards of directors may be less able to adjust their meeting schedules in times of dire need, and 
the presence of foreign directors appears to limit the meeting frequency. 
Panel B reports the distribution of selected variables by proportion of foreign non-
executive directors. The results indicate that firms with only domestic non-executive directors 
have significantly smaller boards, smaller proportion of non-executive directors and foreign 
executive directors, and hold relatively larger number of meetings. Interestingly, these firms 
are run by relatively younger directors, they are smaller, and they generate significantly higher 
total shareholder returns. The effects of risk (SD ROA) and growth (MB) are relatively weak. 
Overall, these results indicate that the distribution of foreign non-executive directors across UK 
companies is not random, but driven by firm’s fundamental and governance characteristics. 
[Insert Table 3 and Figure 2 here] 
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4.2. Multivariate Analysis of Board Meetings 
Table 4 reports the regression results of the determinants of board meetings. We include 
industry as well as year dummies, unless when 2007 and 2003 dummies are used to capture the 
impact of financial crisis and disclosure regulation, respectively. The first 3 regressions based 
on the full sample clearly indicate that the frequency of board meetings is related to firms’ 
fundamental factors and governance structures. They indicate that large firms or firms with 
large boards, and those with high risk as measured by equity beta, but not the standard deviation 
of ROA tend to meet more often. However, mature firms and those with duality of the roles of 
the CEO and the chairman, larger proportion of foreign non-executive directors, longer tenure 
of the CEO and the non-executive directors are much more likely to have lower number of 
meetings. In line with Vafeas (1999), profitability (ROA), is negative indicting that boards of 
financially distressed firms tend to meet more.  
Equation (4) uses the stepwise method which systematically adds the most significant 
variable or removes the least significant variable during each step to identify a useful subset of 
predictors and excludes independent variables that are highly correlated. This method may not 
always end with the model with the highest R2 value possible for a given number of explanatory 
variables, but the predictors are selected on the basis of their statistical impact. The results show 
that meeting frequency is mainly related to some agency conflicts variables. In particular, firms 
with weak board as measured by duality, tenure of CEO and non-executive directors (staggered 
board), have lower meetings frequency. The most significant variable is the proportion of 
foreign non-executive directors. We find, but not report similar results when we use the 
proportion of foreign executive and non-executive directors and the total proportion of non-
executive directors. These results suggest that boards meet less when the internal governance 
system is weak, and when some of the non-executive directors are foreign. These results are 
puzzling as, normally, firms with foreign non-executive directors should meet more often to 
gain from the advice of foreign experts brought in to the board. The negative relationship 
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between meetings and growth can be related to monitoring rather than the advisory role of the 
board, but the negative correlation with profitability indicates that board meetings frequency 
increases with performance challenges, as the board may have extra meetings to approve the 
write-downs of assets or sales of undervalued subsidiaries which both affect reported income. 
The remaining results test for robustness. Equation (5) excludes financial and utility 
companies. We consider that these firms are likely to be regulated, and, consequently, the 
determinants of their board meetings may be different from other firms. We keep 
telecommunications companies as in the UK this sector is competitive and not regulated. 
However, when we also exclude these companies we find, but not report, similar results. The 
exclusion of financial firms allows us also assess the impact of leverage. The results are 
relatively similar. Size is no longer significant. Leverage is positive and significant, while the 
standard deviation of ROA is not significant, suggesting that meetings are likely to respond to 
financial, rather than business, risk. Equations (6) and (7) report the results of the pre- and post-
financial crisis, using the stepwise method for space purposes. The results are relatively similar 
and carry on indicating that the presence of foreign non-executive directors exerts a strong 
negative effect on meeting frequency. In the post-2007 period Beta and PE are not significant. 
Instead CEO tenure and the average age of non-executive directors become significant.  
Overall, while our results indicate that boards focus more on monitoring 
underperformance, there is no indication that they contribute to firm’s growth prospects. The 
negative relationship between PE and meetings suggests that, since high growth firms are less 
likely to have a free cash flow problem, they are not in need of monitoring. However, at the 
same time, they are likely to require advice, which, according to our results, they are not getting 
from their board. PE and MB can also proxy for firm’s complexity. In this case, our results 
indicate that board meetings do not appear to be larger in complex firms. Overall, these findings 
suggest that a long-term weakening of performance and firm specific factors on board meeting 
frequency was replaced by the influence of governance factors, particularly the proportion of 
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foreign non-executive directors. Our results are consistent with Masulis et al. (2012) who report 
that, in the US, foreign non-executive directors display poor board meeting attendance records. 
We contribute to this evidence by showing that they also lead firms to have lower meetings. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
4.3. Impact of meetings and foreign non-executive directors on value creation 
We proceed by assessing the impact of the frequency of board meetings and foreign 
non-executive directors on total shareholder return, TSR, measured as excess returns plus 
dividend yield. The results, reported in Table 5, show that the number of meetings is not 
statistically significant. In contrast, the proportion of foreign non-executive directors is negative 
and significant, suggesting that these foreign directors appear to destroy value. Equation (4) 
shows that meetings frequency and the proportion of foreign non-executive directors are not 
significant when all the explanatory variables are accounted for. However, Equation (5) 
indicates that the combination of foreign directors and meetings frequency is positively related 
to total shareholder return. These results suggest that it is not meetings frequency or the 
presence of foreign non-executive directors per se that affects value, but the interaction between 
these two variables. Therefore, it appears that firms that are able to extract monitoring and 
advisory benefits from foreign directors generate significantly higher returns. 
The remaining variables show that duality does not affect value. However, this may be 
due to the relatively low number of firms that do not split the roles of the CEO and the chairman. 
The CEO and NED tenure and the average age of the non-executive directors affect positively 
stock returns while the average age of executive directors is negative. Consistent with previous 
evidence (e.g., Yermack, 1996) board size is negatively related to returns. In terms of 
fundamentals, large firms with high growth opportunities generate higher returns. Interestingly, 
while tenure of the CEO and non-executive directors is positively related to shareholder returns, 
the impact of age is not homogenous. The results indicate that older non-executive directors 
create value, but younger CEOs appear to affect positively shareholder value creation.  
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[Insert Table 5 here] 
4.4. The determinants of FNED 
As the previous sections report that foreign non-executive directors are negatively 
related to the frequency of board meetings and they do not necessarily create value, it is worth 
investigating the drivers of their presence in UK companies. The purpose of this section is to 
focus on this question. We run a set of regressions to explain the determinants of FNED. Table 
6 reports the results. We use overseas tax to assess the extent to which the firm is committed to 
foreign countries, and thus may need or seek to have foreign representation in their board.18 We 
control for size, by including firm equity value, risk using Beta, standard deviation of ROA and 
leverage for non-financial companies, which is not reported as it wasn’t significant. Finally, we 
account for annual total shareholder returns, TSR, and growth as measured by PE, which we 
test for robustness using market-to-book ratio.  
Equation (1) reports the results of the impact of fundamental variables on the presence 
of foreign non-executive directors. As expected, large firms and those with significant foreign 
operations are more likely to have foreign non-executive directors. These results are consistent 
with Knyazeva et al. (2013) who argue that firms with less visibility are less likely to attract 
non-local directors. However, our results indicate that the dominant contributor of the presence 
of these directors is the existence of foreign executive directors, suggesting that foreign 
executive and non-executive directors may be endogenously determined.19 Our results also 
imply that foreign non-executive directors are more likely to be selected by the executive 
directors, who are themselves more likely to be foreign, rather than necessarily representing 
shareholders. They are, therefore, more likely to be grey rather than independent. 
                                                 
18 Unfortunately data on foreign investors is not available. We have also tried to use acquisitions of foreign 
companies and/or subsidiaries. We find that nearly all our companies had at least one takeover event of foreign 
firms during our sample period. We find same results using foreign turnover. 
19 We do not test for the possibility that foreign executives and non-executives are endogenously determined as 
our focus is on the impact of foreign non-executive directors on meetings.  
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Interestingly, foreign non-executive directors are not necessarily present in high growth 
firms, but they seem to choose firms with low risk as measured by the standard deviation of 
ROA. We consider that high growth and high risk firms are more likely to need advice, and 
thus expertise of the foreign non-executive directors. At the same time, as shown in the previous 
section, the relationship between the presence of foreign non-executive directors and TSR is 
negative. Our results imply that foreign non-executive directors are less likely to monitor and 
to provide advice to their firms. They may be recruited mainly to accomplish the third role of 
non-executive directors, which is contacts with potential clients (Lasfer, 2006). However, this 
role is not manifested in value creation.  
Equation (2) tests for the impact of board structure on the presence of foreign non-
executive directors. The results indicate that these directors are more likely to be in firms with 
large boards, consistent with the predictions of the agency conflicts theory (Yermack, 1996).  
However, at the same time these firms have also a high proportion of non-executive directors, 
with low tenure but older than their counterparts in firms with no or low proportion of foreign 
non-executive directors. In line with the results in Equation (1), foreign executive directors 
appear to be the dominant reason for firms to have foreign non-executive directors.   
Equation (3) reports the results based on stepwise regressions’ method. The results are 
relatively consistent with those reported in Equations (1) and (2). However, they indicate that 
it is not the size of the firm per se that impacts the presence of foreign non-executive directors, 
but the size of the board. The positive effect of the Post-2003 dummy indicates that these 
foreign directors are more predominant in UK companies in the post 2003 period, due probably 
to disclosure requirements. The impact of firm growth, as measured by PE is now positive and 
significant. However, when we use market-to-book, the relationship becomes weak. Equation 
(4) is based on a restricted sample which excludes financial and utility firms. The results are 
relatively similar, except that the tenure of CEO is now positive and significant. We also include 
leverage in this regression but it didn’t come significant, suggesting that debt financing, and 
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thus financial risk, is not a significant drivers of foreign non-executive directors. The results 
are similar when we check for robustness using change in EPS, ROE, instead of TSR and when 
we use TD/EBITDA or long-term debt over market value of equity, as proxy for stress. Overall, 
our results indicate that foreign non-executive directors are not homogeneously determined, but 
they appear to be driven by a specific set of firm’s fundamental and governance characteristics.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
4.4. Impact of meetings’ frequency and foreign non-executive directors on compensation 
In this section we assess the impact of meetings and foreign non-executive directors on 
managerial compensation. We expect low meetings frequency and the presence of foreign non-
executive directors to have a positive impact on compensation if these two mechanisms are 
used to exacerbate the agency conflicts. Consistent with these arguments, the results, reported 
in Table 7, Equation (1), show a strong positive effect of the proportion of foreign non-
executive directors and a negative impact of the meetings frequency on CEO compensation, 
suggesting that these two factors exacerbate agency conflicts. However, Equation (3) indicates 
that these two factors do not affect the compensation of the chairman.  
To assess the joint impact of meetings and foreign non-executive directors, we define a 
dummy for companies with lower than median meetings frequency and with FNED, Meetings 
x FNED. This variable is not significant in both CEO and chairman regressions, suggesting that 
the impact of these two factors is more likely to be direct rather combined. Equations (2) and 
(4) are based on the stepwise method. In both cases, the variable Meetings x FNED is not 
significant. Equation (2) shows that for the CEO compensation both foreign non-executive 
directors and the frequency of meetings exert significant impact. In contrast, Equation (4) 
indicates that firms with a high proportion of foreign non-executive directors appear to have 
higher compensation of their chairmen.   
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We check for robustness by defining this dummy to represent firms with lower than 
median meetings frequency and higher than median proportion of foreign non-executive 
directors. We find, but do not report, relatively the same results. Similarly, our results did not 
change when we define the dependent variable as compensation relative to annual median 
compensation. Overall, these results suggest that firms that have more meetings, and where all 
the non-executive directors are locals, have lower compensation, and the managers are more 
likely to align their interest with that of their shareholders.  
Table 7 reports a strong correlation between the compensation of the CEO and that of 
the non-executive directors. However, the relationship with the compensation of the chairman 
is weak. Moreover, consistent with Ozkan (2011), we find that the relationship between 
compensation of CEO and total shareholder returns is not significant, and it is negative and 
significant in the case of the compensation of the chairman. We also find, but not report, no 
relationship when we use accounting measures of performance, such as ROE and ROA, or when 
we exclude financial and utility companies. Corporate governance guidelines in the UK, such 
as Greenbury (1995), strongly stress aligning CEO compensation with performance. Our results 
suggest that such guidelines have not been effective at best, or heeded, at worst.  
We also assess the impact of complexity and risk as reflected in firm size, growth 
potentials, and earnings’ volatility. We recognise that size is a noisy proxy for complexity. 
Given that organizational complexity is a multidimensional construct, previous studies (e.g., 
Bushman, et al., 2004; Black, et al., 2014) use total number of subsidiaries or total number of 
foreign subsidiaries. Unfortunately, this data is not available. We complement our analysis by 
using PE to proxy for growth potentials, and this could reflect firms’ complexity. In line with 
previous studies, the results indicate that compensation is positively related to firm’s size, 
suggesting that in large firms, the CEO and chairman get higher compensation. The impact of 
PE is limited to the compensation of the CEO. The relationship is negative and significant, 
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implying that in mature companies, managers tend to get higher remuneration. Similar results 
are obtained when we use total assets as a proxy of size and market-to-book instead of PE. 
We also use the standard deviation in ROA to proxy for business risk and leverage to 
measure financial risk when we exclude financial and utility firms. It is conceivable that since, 
as shown in Table 6, firms with more foreign non-executive directors are larger and have more 
foreign operations, they are more risky than the remaining firms. Their managers will therefore 
ask for higher pay to compensate for bearing greater risk. Conyon et al. (2011) find that after 
adjusting for the risk premium to compensate for equity incentives, U.S. CEOs total pay is not 
consistently higher than that for U.K. CEOs. These results are in line with Fernandes, et al., 
(2013) and Gao, et al., (2012). Unfortunately, we do not have data to compute risk-adjusting 
compensation. To overcome this limitation, we use the standard deviation of ROA to control 
for risk. The results indicate that this variable is not significant. We find, but do not report, 
similar results for leverage when we exclude financial and utility companies, and when we use 
firm’s equity beta instead of SD_ROA. 
Overall, our results are consistent with more recent evidence (Guthrie et al., 2012) and 
suggest that, in line with the managerial power hypothesis, internal governance system is not 
likely to mitigate the agency conflicts. However, we extend this literature by focussing on the 
impact of meetings’ frequency and board diversity, namely the presence of foreign non-
executive directors. We find that these two factors exert complementary effects. Our results 
imply that managers are likely to use meetings and the proportion of foreign non-executive 
directors to exacerbate the agency conflicts by awarding themselves high compensation, not 
directly related to performance. Our findings hold even after accounting for firms’ 
fundamentals, including risk and complexity. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
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5. Conclusions 
The role and the functioning of the board of directors has come under vast scrutiny in 
recent years. One argument is that boards may not matter in good times when all is working 
well, but they quickly rise to prominence to grasp control when management is failing and firm 
is in turmoil. Fundamental to this line of reasoning is frequent monitoring to know when to 
grasp control. Many theoretical studies argue that, while executive directors are less likely to 
challenge the CEO, outside directors may have weaker incentives to monitor, because of higher 
information acquisition costs, and their dependence on the CEO for their information (e.g., 
Fama and Jensen, 1983; Harris and Raviv, 2008; Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008). We 
expand this research on the role and practice at the board.  We use our findings to further assess 
the value added of the board of directors focusing on the meetings frequency and the presence 
of foreign non-executive directors in the board.  
Agency framework, corporate governance guidelines, and contracting theory suggest 
that firms self-determine their board meeting frequencies and structure their boards according 
to their monitoring and advising needs (e.g., Duchin et al., 2010). We show that board meetings 
and board composition are inter-related. We find evidence that board meetings are constrained 
by the presence of foreign non-executive directors, leading to lower shareholder returns and 
higher compensation of the CEO and the chairman. Boards where the majority of members are 
nationals appear to meet 50% more times per annum, yet boards with international majorities 
are more likely at firms with greater international operations and high complexity.  
Sporadic anecdotal and annual report evidence implies that there are substantially more 
committee meetings, but the decline in the number of full board meetings indicates that time is 
a constraint to review the committees’ work. The empirical evidence demonstrates that the time 
interval for full board meetings to review the committee’s work has increased. On a broad level, 
this result is consistent with Vafeas (1999) who finds among large US firms increasing board 
size correlated with increased meetings, though in the UK it is the reverse that the average board 
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size is shrinking, but, at the same, the average meeting frequency is going down too. We 
contribute to the previous literature by suggesting that the decline in full board meetings is 
linked to the increased representation of foreign non-executive directors who may only agree 
to serve in fewer meetings to minimise travel. Foreign non-executive directors may also see 
their roles as more advisory than monitoring. However, we find their presence in more mature 
and low risk firms. Overall, our results highlight the need to (1) link the compensation of the 
non-executive directors to meeting commitments, attendance, and/or firm performance, (2) 
disclose board meetings minutes, or at least, the board meetings and their attendance.   
Our analysis may suffer from a number of limitations. Although our sample covers a 
large proportion of the market value of UK listed firms it may be limited as we exclude firms 
that did not disclose full information. We do not have data on the split of the compensation 
between cash and options components of CEOs to test whether the impact of meetings and the 
presence of foreign non-executive directors are more pronounced for cash or other awards. The 
data of the agenda and minutes of the meetings is not available, making it difficult to evaluate 
fully the necessity of board meetings and the negative impact of foreign non-executive 
directors. We do not have data on specific major decisions, such as raising capital and mergers 
and acquisitions that may have solicited some board meetings. We are not able to gather data 
on ownership to assess whether large shareholders mitigate the agency conflicts inherent in 
management compensation, to identify the nationalities of the foreign non-executive directors, 
and to find out whether the presence of foreign non-executive directors is the outcome of 
foreign shareholding. Finally, although we used the interaction variable to assess the joint effect 
of board meetings and foreign non-executive directors, there may be some causality effects 
across the variables that might affect our results. The extent to which such factors will alter or 
strengthen our results is the subject of further research.20 
                                                 
20 We surveyed two firms’ secretaries, one in beverage and the other in pharmaceutical. One stated that that fewer 
board meetings made it possible to attract the right calibre of international participants who were focused on more 
strategic and international concerns, noting that these are fewer but bigger issues than were discussed in the past. 
Page 30 of 44 
References 
Adams, Renee B., 2000, The Dual Role of Corporate Boards as Advisors and Monitors of 
Management: Theory and Evidence. http://ssrn.com/abstract= 241 581 
Adams, Renee B., 2005, What do Boards do? Evidence from Board Committee and Director 
Compensation Data. http://ssrn.com/abstract=397401 
Adams, Renee B. and Daniel Ferreira, 2007, A theory of friendly boards, Journal of Finance 
62, 217-250. 
Adams, Renee B., B.E. Hermalin and Michael S. Weisbach, 2010, The role of board of directors 
in corporate governance: A conceptual framework and survey, Journal of Economic 
Literature, 48, 59–108. 
Adams, Renee B. and Daniel Ferriera, 2012, Regulatory Pressure and Bank Directors’ 
Incentives to Attend Board Meetings International Review of Finance, 12:1, 2012: pp. 
227–248 
Agrawal, Anup and Charles R. Knoeber, 2001, Do some outside directors play a political role? 
Journal of Law & Economics 44, 179-198  
Agrawal, Anup and Charles R. Knoeber, 2012, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, 
In Thomas, Christopher R. and William F. Shughart II, eds., Chapter 26, Oxford 
Handbook in Managerial Economics, 2012, Oxford University Press, New York, NY. 
Alam, Z., M. Chen, C. Ciccotello, and C. Ryan. 2014. Does the location of directors matter? 
Information acquisition and decisions by the board. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis. 49, 131-164 
Bebchuk, Lucian and Jesse Fried, 2004, Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of 
Executive Compensation, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
                                                 
The other argued that fewer meetings reduced the travel burden on international directors, and added that in moving 
to bi-monthly meetings from monthly meetings, meeting time increased from one-half to full day meetings. This 
may be a way of further research. 
Page 31 of 44 
Bebchuk, Lucian and Michael S. Weisbach, 2010, The state of corporate governance research, 
Review of Financial Studies 23, 939-961. 
Berle Jr., Adolf A. and Gardiner C. Means, 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, The MacMillan Company, New York.  
Bhagat, S., and Black, B., 2002, The Non-Correlation Between Board Indpendence and Long-
Term Firm Performance, Journal of Corporation Law 27, 231-274. 
Black, D., Dikolli, S., and Dyreng, S. (2014). CEO Pay-for-Complexity and the Risk of 
Managerial Diversion from Multinational Diversification. Contemporary Accounting 
Research 31, 103-135. 
Booth, L., Aivazian, V., Demirguc-Kunt, A., and Maksimovic, V., 2001, Capital Structures in 
Developing Countries, The Journal of Finance, 56 (1), 87–130. 
Boone, Audra L., Laura Casares Field, Jonathan M. Karpoff, and Charu G. Raheja, 2007, The 
determinants of corporate board size and composition: An empirical analysis, Journal 
of Financial Economics 85, 66-101. 
Borokhovich, Kenenth A., Kelly R. Brunarski, Claire E. Crutchley and Betty J. Simkins. 2004, 
Board Composition and Corporate Use of Interest Rate Derivatives, Journal of 
Financial Research 27, 199-216. 
Brick, Ivan E. and N.K.Chidambaran, 2010, Board Meetings, Committee Structure, and Firm 
value, Journal of Corporate Finance, 16, 533-553. 
Bushman, R, Chenb,Q., Engel, E., and Smith, A. (2004). Financial Accounting Information, 
Organizational Complexity, and Corporate Governance Systems.  Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 37, 167-201. 
Carter, D.A., Simkins, B.J. and Simpson, W.G., 2003, Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, 
and Firm Value, Financial Review 38, 33-53. 
Chambers, Andrew, 2005, Tottel’s Corporate Governance Handbook, Third Edition, Tottel, 
Haywards Heath, West Sussex. 
Page 32 of 44 
Cohn, J.B. and U. Rajan, 2013 Optimal Corporate Governance in the Presence of an Activist 
Investor, Review of Financial Studies, 26, 985-1020 
Coles, Jeffrey L., Daniel Naveen, and Lalitha Naveen, 2008, Boards: Does one size fit all? 
Journal of Financial Economics 87, 329-356. 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance, 2003, London: The Financial Reporting Council 
Conyon, M. J., Core, J. E. and Guay, W.R. (2011). Are U.S. CEOs Paid more than U.K. CEOs? 
Inferences from Risk-adjusted Pay. Review of Financial Studies 24, 402-438. 
Core, John E., Robert W. Holthausen and David F. Larcker, 1999, Corporate Governance, Chief 
Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance, Journal of Financial 
Economics 51, 371-406. 
Dionne, Georges and Triki, Thouraya, 2005, Risk Management and Corporate Governance: 
The Importance of Independence and Financial Knowledge for the Board and the Audit 
Committee. http://ssrn.com/abstract=730743 
Duchin, Ran, John G. Matsusaka, and Oguzhan Ozbas, 2010, When are outside directors 
effective? Journal of Financial Economics, 96, 195–214. 
Fama, Eugene F. and Michael C. Jensen, 1983, Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal 
of Law and Economics 26, 301-326. 
Farrell, Kathleen A. and Philip L. Hersch, 2005, Additions to corporate boards:  the effect of 
gender, Journal of Corporate Finance 11, 85-106. 
Fernandes, N., Ferreira, M.A., Matos, P. and Murphy, K. J. (2013). Are U.S. CEOs Paid more? 
New International Evidence. Review of Financial Studies 26, 323-367 
Ferris, Stephen P., Murali Jagannathan and A. C. Pritchard, 2003, Too Busy To Mind The 
Business? Monitoring By Directors With Multiple Board Appointments, Journal of 
Finance 58, 1087-1112. 
Fich, Eliezer M. and Anil Shivdasani, 2006, Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors? Journal of 
Finance, 61, 689-724. 
Page 33 of 44 
Gao, H., Lemmon, M., and Li, K. (2012). Are CEOs in U.S. Public Firms Overpaid? New 
Evidence from Private Firms. University of British Columbia working paper. 
Giannetti, Mariassunta, Guanmin Liao, and Xiaoyun Yu, 2015, The Brain Gain of Corporate 
Boards: Evidence from China, Journal of Finance (Forthcoming)  
Gilson, Stuart C., 1990, Bankruptcy, boards, banks, and blockholders:  evidence on changes in 
corporate ownership and control when firms default, Journal of Financial Economics 
27, 355-387. 
Greenbury, (1995), Directors’ Remuneration:  Report of a study group chaired by Sir Richard 
Greenbury, London: Gee Publishing. 
Guthrie, Katherine, Jan Sokolowsky, Kam-Ming Wan (2012), CEO Compensation and Board 
Structure Revisited, Journal of Finance 67, 1149–1168. 
Harris, Milton, and Artur Raviv, 2008, A theory of board control and size, Review of Financial 
Studies 21, 1797-1832. 
Helland, Eric, and Sykuta, Michael, 2004, Regulation and the evolution of corporate boards:  
Monitoring, advising, or window dressing? Journal of Law & Economics 47, 195-222. 
Hermalin, Benjamin E., and Michael S., Weisbach, 2003, Boards of directors as an 
endogenously determined institution:  A survey of the economic literature, Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York: Economic Policy Review 9, 7-27. 
Jensen, Michael C., 1993. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and Failure of Internal 
Control Systems, Journal of Finance 48, 831-880. 
Jensen, Michael C, 1986. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers.  
American Economic Review 76, 323-29 
John, Kose and Lemma W. Senbet, 1998, Corporate Governance And Board Effectiveness, 
Journal of Banking and Finance 22, 371-404. 
Kaplan, Steven N., and David Reishus, 1990, Outside Directorship and Corporate Performance. 
Journal of Financial Economics 27, 389-410. 
Page 34 of 44 
Kaufman, Allen, Ernie Englander and Christopher L. Tucci, 2005, The Managerial Power 
Thesis Revised:  CEO Compensation and the Independence of Independent CEO 
Directors. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030845.  
Knyazeva, Anzhela, Diane Knyazeva and Ronald D. Masulis, 2013, The Supply of Corporate 
Directors and Board Independence, Review of Financial Studies, 26, 1561-1605 
Kroszner, Randall S. and Philip E. Strahan, 2001, Bankers on Boards, Journal of Financial 
Economics 62, 415-452. 
Kumar, Praveen, and K. Sivaramakrishnan, 2008, Who monitors the monitor? The effect of 
board independence on executive compensation and firm value, Review of Financial 
Studies 21, 1371-1401. 
Lasfer, M. Ameziane, 2006, The interrelationship between managerial ownership and board 
structure, Journal of Business, Finance, and Accounting 33, 1006-1033. 
Lehn, K.M., Patro, S., and Zhao, M., 2009. Determinants of the size and composition of US 
corporate boards: 1935-2000. Financial Management 38 (4), 747-780. 
Linck, James S., Jeffry M. Netter, and Tina Yang, 2008, The determinants of board structure, 
Journal of Financial Economics 87, 308-328. 
Lorsch, Jay W. and Elizabeth MacIver, 1989, Pawns or Potentates:  The Reality of America's 
Corporate Board Rooms.  Harvard Business School Press, Boston, Massachusetts. 
Masulis, Ronald W., Cong.Wang, and Fei. Xie. 2012. Globalizing the boardroom - The effects 
of foreign directors on corporate governance and firm performance. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 53:527–54. 
Merchant, K. and Pick, K., 2010, Biases and Other Pathologies in the Boardroom. Business 
Expert Press, New-York, NY. 
Miletkov, Mihail Annette Poulsen, and M. Babajide Wintoki, 2013, A multinational study of 
foreign directors on non-U.S. corporate boards, Electronic copy available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2024655 
Page 35 of 44 
Ozkan, Neslihan, 2011, CEO compensation and firm performance: an empirical investigation 
of UK panel data. European Financial Management, 17, 260 - 285. 
Petersen, M., 2009. Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: comparing 
approaches. Review of Financial Studies 22, 435–480. 
Raheja, Charu, G., 2005. Determinants of board size and composition: A theory of corporate 
boards. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 40, 283–306. 
Singh, Val and Susan Vinnicombe, 2004, Why so few women directors in top UK boardrooms? 
Evidence and theoretical explanations, Corporate Governance 12, 479-488. 
Schwartz-Ziv Miriam, and Michael S. Weisbach, 2013, What do boards really do? Evidence 
from minutes of board meetings, Journal of Financial Economics, 108, 349-366.  
Vafeas, Nikos, 1999, Board Meeting Frequency and Firm Performance, Board Dynamics and 
the Influence of Professional Background, Gender and Ethnic Diversity of Directors, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 53, 113-142. 
Vienot, Marc, 1995, Le Conseil D’Administration des Sociétés Cotées: Rapport du groupe de 
travail, L’Association Française des Entreprises Privées and Le Conseil National du 
Patronat Français (original French and English translations), known as “Vienot I”. 
Walker, Sir David, 2009, A review of governance in UK banks and other financial industry 
entities: Final recommendations, Financial Services Authority, London. 
Wan, H. 2008. Are local directors better monitors? Working Paper, University of South Florida. 
Yermack, David, 1996, Higher valuation of companies with a small board of directors, Journal 
of Financial Economics, 40, 185-211.  
Yermack, David, 2004, Remuneration, Retention, And Reputation Incentives For Outside 
Directors, Journal of Finance 59, 2281-2308. 
 
Page 36 of 44 
Table 1.  Annual and Industry Distribution of Meetings and Board Characteristics 
The sample includes 241 UK firms from 1999 to 2012. Meetings is the number of full board meeting per year; Board Size is total board membership, Duality if a dummy equal 
to one if the chairman holds also the CEO position, NED is the proportion of non-executive directors, excluding the chairman, relative to total board directors, FNED is the 
ratio of foreign non-executive directors over total non-executive directors; FD is the proportion of foreign executive and non-executive directors in the board; Basic materials: 
chemicals, forestry and paper, industrial metals and mining, and mining. Consumer goods: automobile and parts, beverages, food producers, household goods and home 
construction, leisure and goods, personal goods and tobacco. Consumer services: food and drug retailers, general retailers, media, travel and leisure. Financials: banks, 
insurance, real estate and investment companies. Health care: health care equipment and services and pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms. Industrials: construction and 
materials, aerospace and defence, general industrials, electronic and electrical equipment, industrial engineering, industrial transportation, and support services. Oil and Gas: 
oil and gas producers and oil equipment services. Technology: software and computer services and technology hardware and equipment. Telecom: fixed line and mobile 
telecommunications. Utilities: electricity, gas, water and multi-utilities.  
 N 
Meetings Board Size  Duality NED FNED FD 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A. Annual Distribution 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
95 
112 
114 
111 
116 
196 
124 
121 
131 
135 
140 
143 
143 
135  
9.326 
9.259 
8.570 
8.459 
8.655 
8.434 
8.669 
8.926 
8.695 
8.543 
8.264 
8.790 
8.280 
8.333 
10.00 
9.00 
8.00 
8.00 
9.00 
8.00 
8.00 
9.00 
8.00 
8.00 
8.00 
8.00 
8.00 
8.00 
11.442 
11.527 
11.439 
10.937 
10.897 
10.852 
10.887 
10.678 
10.382 
10.257 
10.300 
10.154 
10.406 
10.519 
11.00 
11.00 
11.00 
11.00 
10.00 
11.00 
11.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
0.042 
0.054 
0.035 
0.027 
0.043 
0.056 
0.057 
0.025 
0.031 
0.029 
0.036 
0.021 
0.028 
0.015 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.488 
0.493 
0.501 
0.505 
0.515 
0.537 
0.552 
0.565 
0.577 
0.578 
0.593 
0.605 
0.603 
0.608 
0.500 
0.500 
0.500 
0.500 
0.500 
0.538 
0.556 
0.556 
0.571 
0.571 
0.592 
0.625 
0.615 
0.625 
0.183 
0.211 
0.265 
0.289 
0.290 
0.281 
0.289 
0.284 
0.336 
0.277 
0.340 
0.363 
0.365 
0.374 
0.143 
0.167 
0.225 
0.250 
0.236 
0.211 
0.250 
0.250 
0.333 
0.250 
0.333 
0.333 
0.333 
0.333 
0.156 
0.177 
0.218 
0.232 
0.234 
0.229 
0.251 
0.237 
0.275 
0.211 
0.281 
0.304 
0.311 
0.321 
0.111 
0.111 
0.167 
0.200 
0.177 
0.182 
0.240 
0.200 
0.250 
0.222 
0.250 
0.250 
0.250 
0.250 
Panel B. Industry Distribution 
Basic Material 
Consumer Goods 
Consumer Services 
Financials 
Health Care 
Industrials 
Oil and Gas 
Technology 
Telecom 
Utilities 
132 
163 
354 
361 
62 
324 
87 
59 
39 
135 
7.515 
7.252 
8.977 
9.208 
6.887 
8.790 
8.885 
6.797 
9.359 
9.793 
8.00 
7.00 
9.00 
9.00 
6.00 
9.00 
9.00 
6.00 
9.00 
10.00 
10.621 
10.675 
10.404 
12.064 
11.468 
9.772 
11.678 
9.814 
11.897 
9.881 
11.00 
10.00 
10.00 
12.00 
12.00 
9.00 
11.00 
10.00 
12.00 
10.00 
0.061 
0.031 
0.040 
0.036 
0.016 
0.031 
0.012 
0.068 
0.051 
0.030 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.627 
0.588 
0.556 
0.565 
0.629 
0.499 
0.577 
0.488 
0.588 
0.507 
0.636 
0.600 
0.556 
0.556 
0.667 
0.500 
0.571 
0.462 
0.583 
0.500 
0.561 
0.400 
0.277 
0.230 
0.638 
0.200 
0.439 
0.326 
0.365 
0.160 
0.600 
0.400 
0.200 
0.182 
0.600 
0.200 
0.375 
0.333 
0.429 
0.000 
0.512 
0.332 
0.223 
0.191 
0.498 
0.179 
0.345 
0.256 
0.318 
0.109 
0.500 
0.300 
0.167 
0.167 
0.500 
0.143 
0.300 
0.222 
0.385 
0.083 
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Table 2. Description of the meetings frequency, board characteristics and fundamental variables  
The table provides the descriptive statistics of the dependent and the proxy explanatory variables. The sample includes 241 UK firms with full disclosure of 
meetings and other relevant data, over the period 1999 to 2012, resulting in 1716 firm-year observations. Expected sign (Esign) is between board meetings and 
the remaining variables. ρ is the correlation of the variables with meetings. Board Size is total board membership, Duality if a dummy equal to one if the 
chairman holds also the CEO position, NED is the proportion of non-executive directors, excluding the chairman, relative to total board directors, FNED is the 
ratio of foreign non-executive directors over total non-executive directors; FD is the proportion of foreign executive and non-executive directors in the board; 
WNED is the proportion of non-executive directors that are women; Tenure is the average number of years non-executive directors (NED), the chairman (Chair) 
and CEO were on the board; Age is the average number of years of NEDs or CEO; Pay NED is the average pay for an NED for all board services provided 
(excluding any advisory or consulting fees and excluding fees for non-executive chairmen); Size is year-end market capitalisation (in £m); BETA is the regression 
coefficient obtained by regressing each firm’s stock returns against the FTSE 350 index; TSR is total shareholder return computed as the cumulative one year 
returns plus dividend yield; ROA is the ratio of EBIT over total assets, MB is year-end market value of equity to book value of equity; PE is price to earnings 
ratio; Leverage is total debt over total assets; SD ROA is standard deviation of return on assets over each firm’s sample period. ***, **, * Significant at 0.01, 0.05 
and 0.1 level, respectively. 
Variable Esign Full Sample Pre-2007 (1) Post-2007 (2) p-value (1)–(2) 
    ρ  Mean Median  Max  Min ρ  Mean Median ρ  Mean Median  Mean Median 
Meetings 
Board Size 
Duality 
NED 
FNED 
FD 
WNED 
NED Tenure 
Chair_Tenure 
CEO_Tenure 
NED Age 
ED Age 
NED Pay 
Size (£m) 
BETA 
TSR 
ROA 
MB 
PE 
Leverage 
SD ROA 
  
- 
- 
+ 
- 
- 
+ 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
1.000 
0.022 
-0.043* 
-0.117*** 
-0.261*** 
-0.258*** 
0.092*** 
-0.077*** 
-0.071*** 
-0.118*** 
-0.031 
-0.027 
-0.05 
0.031 
0.068** 
0.003 
-0.131*** 
-0.061** 
-0.11*** 
0.032 
-0.098*** 
8.632 
 10.752 
 0.036 
 0.554 
 0.302 
 0.251 
 0.172 
 4.232 
 4.453 
 5.028 
 58.599 
 50.850 
 53.591 
 10,857 
 1.074 
 0.061 
 0.058 
 3.151 
 18.384 
 0.259 
 0.045  
8.000 
10.000 
0.000 
0.556 
0.250 
0.200 
0.167 
4.000 
3.500 
4.000 
59.000 
51.000 
50.000 
 3,667  
1.014 
0.042 
0.051 
2.320 
14.900 
0.251 
0.032 
28.000 
22.000 
1.000 
0.900 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
17.000 
50.000 
34.000 
73.800 
77.000 
210.000 
 155,859  
2.145 
2.448 
0.671 
89.740 
185.067 
0.939 
0.534 
1.000 
5.000 
0.000 
0.222 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
45.000 
35.000 
0.000 
1.000 
0.202 
-1.682 
-0.786 
-70.100 
0.000 
0.000 
0.001 
1.000 
0.043 
-0.061* 
-0.108*** 
-0.395*** 
-0.385*** 
0.129*** 
-0.050 
-0.115*** 
-0.044 
-0.068* 
-0.005 
-0.067 
-0.012 
0.109*** 
0.010 
-0.143*** 
-0.048 
-0.171*** 
0.003 
-0.110*** 
8.722  
 11.103  
 0.046  
 0.516  
 0.262  
 0.217  
 0.169  
 4.205  
 4.529  
 4.635  
 58.347  
 50.621  
 43.122  
 9,447  
 1.070  
 0.140  
 0.053  
 3.178  
 18.737  
 0.280  
 0.044  
9.000  
 11.000 
0.000 
0.500 
0.200 
0.167 
0.167 
4.000 
3.000 
3.000 
58.700 
51.000 
40.000 
3520 
1.007 
0.108 
0.050 
2.310 
15.100 
0.272 
0.033 
1.000 
-0.007 
-0.029 
-0.115*** 
-0.151*** 
-0.157*** 
0.061* 
-0.108*** 
-0.026 
-0.174*** 
0.006 
-0.04 
-0.049 
0.066* 
-0.058 
-0.019 
-0.120*** 
-0.074** 
-0.067* 
0.049 
-0.087** 
8.539  
 10.393  
 0.026  
 0.592  
 0.342  
 0.286  
 0.176  
 4.259  
 4.374  
 5.429  
 58.856  
 51.085  
 56.084  
 12,337  
 1.087  
-0.020  
 0.063  
 3.123  
 18.013  
 0.237  
 0.046  
8.000  
 10.000  
0.000 
0.600 
0.333 
0.250 
0.167 
4.000 
3.800 
4.000 
59.000 
51.000 
52.500 
 3,810  
1.054 
-0.027 
0.052 
2.350 
14.428 
0.223 
0.032 
0.137 
0.000 
0.025 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.284 
0.555 
0.472 
0.001 
0.001 
0.014 
0.000 
0.003 
0.488 
0.000 
0.009 
0.874 
0.367 
0.000 
0.287 
0.008 
0.000 
0.472 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.060 
0.089 
0.124 
0.000 
0.000 
0.211 
0.000 
0.000 
0.479 
0.000 
0.235 
0.840 
0.000 
0.000 
0.716 
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Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics of some Explanatory Variables by  Meeting Frequency and Foreign Non-executive Directors
The sample includes 241 UK firms with full disclosure of meetings and other relevant data, over the period 1999 to 2012, resulting in 1716 
firm-year observations. Board is total board membership; Duality if a dummy equal to one if the chairman holds also the CEO position, NED 
is the proportion of non-executive directors, excluding the chairman, relative to total board directors, FNED is the ratio of foreign non-executive 
directors over total non-executive directors; FD is the proportion of foreign executive and non-executive directors in the board; WNED is the 
proportion of non-executive directors that are women; Tenure is the average number of years non-executive directors (NED), the chairman 
(Chair) and CEO were on the board; Age is the average number of years of NEDs or CEO; Pay is total compensation; Size is year-end market 
capitalisation (in £m); BETA is the regression coefficient obtained by regressing each firm’s stock returns against the FTSE 350 index; TSR is 
total shareholder return computed as the cumulative one year returns plus dividend yield; ROA is the ratio of EBIT over total assets, MB is year-
end market value of equity to book value of equity; SD ROA is standard deviation of return on assets over each firm’s sample period. ***, **, * 
Significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively.  
 
 Panel A. Distribution by Meetings Frequency 
  Board characteristics Average Tenure Average Age Firm characteristics 
Meetings 
N Board  Duality  NED  FNED FD WNED  NED Chairman CEO NED ED Size TSR MB SD ROA 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
< 4  
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13+ 
35 
90 
243 
210 
316 
250 
223 
150 
117 
82 
10.114 
10.244 
10.757 
11.071 
10.991 
10.564 
10.749 
10.460 
10.709 
11.000 
0.086 
0.033 
0.037 
0.043 
0.054 
0.020 
0.036 
0.020 
0.017 
0.037 
0.606 
0.601 
0.560 
0.560 
0.567 
0.552 
0.536 
0.530 
0.505 
0.560  
 0.371 
0.422 
0.419 
0.349 
0.328 
0.293 
0.245 
0.168 
0.162 
0.200 
0.319 
0.357 
0.340 
0.295 
0.277 
0.244 
0.195 
0.141 
0.134 
0.173  
0.085 
0.114 
0.191 
0.142 
0.168 
0.179 
0.176 
0.197 
0.206 
0.184  
5.114  
 4.973  
 4.352  
 4.272  
 4.087  
 4.195  
 4.034  
 4.087  
 4.230  
 4.056  
6.050  
 5.369  
 5.215  
 4.590  
 4.085  
 4.339  
 3.973  
 4.089  
 4.101  
 4.386  
6.873  
 6.521  
 6.261  
 4.950  
 5.007  
 5.024  
 4.064  
 3.552  
 4.676  
 5.054  
59.49  
 58.92  
 58.53  
 58.55  
 58.75  
 58.71  
 58.37  
 58.57  
 58.60  
 57.98 
51.61  
 51.11  
 51.07  
 50.73  
 51.23  
 50.74  
 50.22  
 50.49  
 50.99  
 50.97  
3,608  
 6,564  
 10,554  
 11,856  
 14,115  
 11,393  
 10,118  
 7,327  
 10,754  
 11,610  
0.005  
 0.085  
 0.080  
 0.068  
 0.057  
 0.041  
 0.008  
 0.073  
 0.104  
 0.123 
3.290  
 4.990  
 4.051  
 3.406  
 2.795  
 2.698  
 2.456  
 2.897  
 3.478  
 2.413 
0.056  
 0.048  
 0.055  
 0.044  
 0.046  
 0.039  
 0.044  
 0.045  
 0.036  
 0.032 
p-Mean>4 - 13+ 
p-Median>4 - 13+ 
0.140 
0.130 
0.353 
0.677 
0.075 
0.045 
0.002 
0.002 
0.005 
0.008 
0.000 
0.000 
0.043 
0.124 
0.173 
0.008 
0.122 
0.003 
0.046 
0.093 
0.654 
0.447 
0.000 
0.000 
0.030 
0.039 
0.509 
0.073 
0.006 
0.001 
Panel B. Distribution by Proportion of Foreign Non-executive Directors 
  Board characteristics Average Tenure Average Age Firm characteristics 
% FNED N Board  Duality  NED  Meeting FD WNED  NED Chairman CEO NED ED Size TSR MB SD ROA 
0 
< 20% 
20% - 25% 
26% - 49% 
50% - 74% 
> 75% 
484 
169 
252 
324 
350 
137 
9.669  
 11.899  
 10.056  
 11.580  
 11.166  
 11.423 
0.041  
 0.036  
 0.040  
 0.022  
 0.043  
 0.029 
0.484  
 0.574  
 0.510  
 0.577  
 0.614  
 0.647 
9.229  
 9.615  
 8.909  
 8.556  
 7.609  
 7.591 
0.030  
 0.135  
 0.178  
 0.286  
 0.465  
 0.681 
0.179  
 0.178  
 0.178  
 0.169  
 0.161  
 0.168 
4.220  
 4.488  
 4.167  
 4.291  
 4.202  
 4.009 
4.888  
 3.917  
 4.291  
 4.363  
 4.276  
 4.533 
5.573  
 4.454  
 4.756  
 4.722  
 4.872  
 5.428 
57.58  
 58.36  
 58.27  
 59.21  
 59.23  
 60.06 
50.36  
 50.04  
 50.53  
 50.90  
 51.52  
 52.36 
4,557  
 9,774  
 5,561  
 14,330  
 15,883  
 23,134 
0.135  
 0.057  
 0.064  
 0.013  
 0.028  
 0.002 
3.051  
 2.768  
 3.352  
 2.930  
 3.342  
 3.645 
0.046  
 0.037  
 0.052  
 0.042  
 0.044  
 0.045 
p-Mean>4 - 13+ 
p-Median>4 - 13+ 
0.000 
0.000 
0.477 
0.517 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.443 
0.486 
0.240 
0.104 
0.440 
0.908 
0.788 
0.364 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.166 
0.005 
0.854 
0.028 
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TABLE 4 – Regression Results of the Determinants of Board Meetings 
The dependent variable is log of Board Meetings. The sample includes 241 UK firms with full disclosure of meetings and other relevant data, over the period 
1999 to 2012, resulting in 1716 firm-year observations. Duality if a dummy equal to one if the chairman holds also the CEO position; FNED is the ratio of 
foreign non-executive directors over total non-executive directors; Tenure is the average number of years non-executive directors (NED), the chairman (Chair) 
and CEO were on the board; Age is the average age of NEDs or executive directors (EDs); Board Size is total board membership; Size is ln of year-end market 
capitalisation; BETA is the regression coefficient obtained by regressing each firm’s stock returns against the FTSE 350 index; ROA is the ratio of EBIT over 
total assets, PE is price to earnings ratio; MB is year-end market to book value of equity; Leverage is total debt over total assets; SD ROA is standard deviation 
of return on assets. The penultimate and final panels are respectively the period prior to and post the Combined Code requirement for board attendance disclosure. 
Fin is for financial companies. ***, **, * significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. VIF is the variance inflation factor to test for multi-collinearity; VIF 
= 1 indicates no correlation, 1 < VIF < 5 moderate correlation and VIF > 5 highly correlated.  
 Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample No Fin and Utility Pre-2006 Post-2007 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
Coef. t-stat     VIF Coef. t-stat VIF Coef. t-stat VIF Coef. t-stat VIF Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat VIF Coef. t-stat VIF 
Constant 
Duality 
FNED 
Tenure Chair 
Tenure CEO 
Tenure NED 
Age NED 
Age ED 
Board Size 
Size 
BETA 
ROA 
PE 
SD_ROA 
MB 
Leverage 
Post-2007 
Post-2003 
 
Year  
Industry  
2.060*** 
-0.070** 
-0.337*** 
-0.002 
-0.004** 
-0.014*** 
0.001 
0.002 
 
0.024*** 
0.055** 
-0.255** 
-0.002*** 
-0.257 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
11.980 
-1.970 
-9.880 
-1.520 
-2.260 
-3.560 
0.400 
0.710 
 
3.040 
2.380 
-2.500 
-3.580 
-1.590  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.02 
1.48 
1.16 
1.19 
1.23 
1.26 
1.22 
 
1.55 
1.53 
1.16 
1.32 
1.21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.049*** 
-0.068** 
-0.348*** 
-0.003* 
-0.004** 
-0.014*** 
0.001 
0.002 
 
0.025*** 
0.054** 
-0.217** 
-0.002*** 
-0.251 
 
 
0.015 
-0.017 
 
No 
Yes 
12.19 
-1.900 
-10.37 
-1.680 
-2.250 
-3.500 
0.470 
0.970 
 
3.200 
2.360 
-2.150 
-3.350 
-1.560 
 
 
0.780 
-1.010 
 
 
 
 
1.02 
1.44 
1.15 
1.18 
1.23 
1.26 
1.20 
 
1.51 
1.53 
1.14 
1.27 
1.21 
 
 
1.46 
1.49 
 
 
 
2.082*** 
-0.072** 
-0.344*** 
-0.003** 
-0.004** 
-0.015*** 
0.001 
0.002 
0.068** 
 
0.047** 
-0.173* 
-0.002*** 
-0.241 
 
 
0.022 
-0.014 
 
No 
Yes 
12.120 
-2.020 
-10.13 
-1.940 
-2.490 
-3.740 
0.500 
1.160 
1.970 
 
2.040 
-1.710 
-3.250 
-1.490 
 
 
1.120 
-0.800 
 
 
 
1.02 
1.46 
1.14 
1.18 
1.23 
1.26 
1.20 
1.33 
 
1.51 
1.13 
1.27 
1.22 
 
 
1.46 
1.50 
 
 
 
2.205*** 
-0.070** 
-0.329*** 
-0.002 
-0.003*** 
-0.014*** 
 
 
 
 
0.025*** 
-0.055** 
-0.249** 
-0.002*** 
-0.256* 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
29.960 
-1.970 
-10.05 
-1.540 
-2.140 
-3.740 
 
 
 
 
3.340 
-2.410 
-2.490 
-3.930 
-1.600 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.01 
1.37 
1.14 
1.15 
1.11 
 
 
 
 
1.34 
1.50 
1.12 
1.23 
1.20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.031*** 
-0.069** 
-0.330*** 
 
 
-0.010*** 
-0.010** 
 
0.004* 
0.081** 
 
 
-0.263** 
-0.001** 
 
0.142*** 
0.030 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
14.120 
-1.720 
-9.160 
 
 
-5.050 
-2.220 
 
1.890 
2.060 
 
 
-2.510 
-2.160 
 
4.780 
1.590 
 
 
 
 
 
1.02 
1.41 
 
 
1.21 
1.12 
 
1.17 
1.23 
 
 
1.04 
1.19 
 
1.27 
1.05 
 
 
 
 
2.082 
-0.055 
-0.414*** 
-0.004** 
 
-0.014*** 
 
 
 
0.026*** 
0.075*** 
-0.409*** 
-0.002*** 
-0.300* 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
27.88 
-1.510 
-13.02 
-2.290 
 
-3.590 
 
 
 
3.380 
3.420 
-3.540 
-4.230 
-1.800 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.01 
1.15 
1.12 
 
1.07 
 
 
 
1.32 
1.30 
1.05 
1.26 
1.22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.603 
-0.098 
-0.13** 
 
-0.01*** 
-0.01** 
0.007* 
 
 
0.04*** 
 
-0.54*** 
 
-0.50** 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
7.130 
-1.490 
-2.800 
 
-4.400 
-2.070 
1.990 
 
 
4.060 
 
-4.230 
 
-2.190 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.01 
1.41 
 
1.08 
1.16 
1.24 
 
 
1.19 
 
1.03 
 
1.06 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N 1716  1716  1716  1716  1220  989  727  
R2 0.247  0.246  0.241  0.235  0.269  0.285  0.167  
F 13.57***  13.57***  16.88***  16.29***  20.90***  27.59***  12.1***  
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Table 5. Meetings and Shareholder Value Creation 
The dependent variable is the total shareholder returns (TSR) defined as abnormal stock returns plus dividends. The sample includes 241 firms 
with complete data from 1999 to 2012 resulting in 1716 observations.  Meetings is ln of the number of meetings per year; FNED is the proportion 
of foreign non-executive directors in the board of directors; Duality if a dummy equal to one if the chairman holds also the CEO position, NED is for non-
executive directors and ED is for executive directors. All the regressions include industry as well as year dummies. VIF is the variance inflation factor to 
test for multi-collinearity; VIF = 1 indicates no correlation, 1 < VIF < 5 moderate correlation and VIF > 5 highly correlated. ***, **, * significant at 0.01, 0.05 
and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
 
 Coef. t-stat     VIF Coef. t-stat     VIF Coef. t-stat     VIF Coef. t-stat     VIF Coef. t-stat     VIF 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant -0.059 -0.680  -0.128** -1.930  -0.078 -0.890  0.592*** 3.180  0.498*** 3.140  
Meetings -0.023 -0.820 1.1
7 
   -0.049 -1.700 1.23 -0.027 -0.930 1.27    
FNED    -0.11*** -3.310 1.4
3 
-0.076* -1.880 2.03 -0.041 -1.000 2.12    
Meetings x FNED       0.023** 2.210 1.67 0.015 1.390 1.73 0.019** 2.230 1.160 
Duality          -0.004 -0.090 1.01    
Tenure Chair          0.003* 1.760 1.10    
Tenure CEO          0.005*** 2.850 1.18 0.003** 1.810 1.090 
Tenure NED          0.008* 1.760 1.21 0.005*** 2.950 1.100 
Age NED          -0.010*** -3.650 1.27 0.008** 1.980 1.170 
Age ED          -0.001 -0.670 1.21 -0.010*** -4.130 1.150 
Board Size          -0.112** -2.810 1.63 -0.120*** -3.080 1.580 
Size 0.004 0.640 1.2
5 
0.009 1.310 1.3
0 
0.013* 1.740 1.35 0.025*** 3.090 1.67 0.024*** 3.230 1.430 
MB 0.004*** 3.530 1.0
3 
0.004*** 3.580 1.0
3 
0.004*** 3.450 1.03 0.004*** 3.450 1.03 0.004*** 3.460 1.020 
                         
Adj R2 0.249  0.254    0.270    0.270    0.272   
F-Stat. 26.92***  25.07**
* 
  23.66   21.1   34.26   
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Table 6. The determinants of FNEDs 
The dependent variable is the proportion of foreign non-executive directors (FNEDs). The sample includes 241 UK firms with full disclosure of meetings and 
other relevant data, over the period 1999 to 2012, resulting in 1716 firm-year observations. Overseas Tax is the proportion of tax paid overseas over the total 
tax; TSR is total shareholder return (dividends and capital gains) at t-1; PE is price to earnings ratio; Size is year-end market capitalisation; SD_ROA is the 
standard deviation of ROA; FED is the proportion of executive directors (EDs) who are not UK based; Board Size is total board membership; %NED is the 
proportion of non-executive directors on the board; Duality is a dummy equal to one if the roles of the CEO and chairman are combined. All the regressions 
include industry dummies and year effect is captured by the post-2003 and post-2007 periods. Equation 4 excludes financial and utility companies. VIF is the 
variance inflation factor to test for multi-collinearity; VIF = 1 indicates no correlation, 1 < VIF < 5 moderate correlation and VIF > 5 highly correlated. ***, **, 
* significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
 Coef. t-stat VIF Coef. t-stat VIF Coef. t-stat VIF Coef. t-stat VIF 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.227*** -4.000  -1.137*** -10.430  -0.995*** -8.340  -1.022*** -7.370  
Overseas Tax 0.040** 2.600 1.13    0.048*** 3.380 1.12 0.045** 2.600 1.05 
TSR -0.084*** -4.660 1.16    -0.054*** -3.220 1.15 -0.054** -2.830 1.11 
PE 0.001 1.600 1.33    0.001** 2.340 1.29 0.002*** 3.320 1.25 
Size 0.036*** 5.720 1.37          
SD_ROA -0.256** -1.910 1.19    -0.230* -1.850 1.19 -0.428** -2.910 1.2 
FED 0.866*** 12.620 1.10 0.789*** 13.610 1.19 0.817*** 12.530 1.14 0.703*** 9.160 1.1 
Board Size    0.139*** 6.240 1.26 0.124*** 4.710 1.25 0.182*** 5.560 1.11 
%NED    0.794*** 16.160 1.42 0.697*** 12.270 1.25 0.885*** 14.050 1.14 
Duality    -0.004 -0.170 1.01       
Tenure Chair     0.000 0.290 1.09       
Tenure CEO    0.002 1.600 1.17    0.006** 2.460 1.21 
Tenure NED    -0.011*** -3.940 1.19 -0.010*** -3.160 1.16 -0.013*** -3.160 1.21 
Age NED    0.010*** 6.010 1.23 0.009*** 4.810 1.19 0.006** 2.460 1.21 
Age ED    0.000 0.110 1.22       
Post-2007 0.021 1.210 1.48 0.022 1.640 1.98       
Post-2003 0.058*** 3.790 1.61 0.004 0.250 1.92 0.038*** 3.060 1.26    
Adj R2 0.367     0.454     0.452     0.457    
F-Stat. 38.76***   72.42***   55.48***   47.88***   
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Table 7. Board meetings, FNEDs, and the compensation of the chairman and CEO 
The dependent variable is log of CEO Remuneration in Panel A, and log of Chairman Remuneration in Panel B. The sample includes 241 UK 
firms with full disclosure of meetings and other relevant data, over the period 1999 to 2012, resulting in 1716 firm-year observations. FNED is the 
proportion of foreign non-executive directors. Meetings is the number of meetings reported by the firms in our sample. Meetings x FNED is a 
dummy for firms with lower than median meetings frequency and foreign non-executive directors. Size is the log of year-end market value of 
equity. Pay Chairman (CEO) is the total annual remuneration for the chairman (chief executive officer), and Pay NED is the average pay for an 
NED for all board services provided (excluding any advisory or consulting fees and excluding fees for non-executive chairmen). Surviovors is a 
dummy equal to one for companies with data over all our sample period. TSR is total shareholder return (dividends and capital gains) at t-1. MB is 
the ratio of year-end market value to book value of equity. All the regressions include industry dummies. Equations (2) and (4) are based on stepwise 
method. VIF is the variance inflation factor to test for multi-collinearity; VIF = 1 indicates no correlation, 1 < VIF < 5 moderate correlation and VIF > 5 highly 
correlated. ***, **, * significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
 
  Coef. t-stat VIF Coef. t-stat VIF Coef. t-stat VIF Coef. t-stat VIF 
 Panel A. Dependent variable: ln(CEO total compensation) Panel B. Dependent variable: ln(Chairman total compensation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 3.393*** 8.290 3.446*** 9.630 1.967*** 3.550 2.245*** 5.590
FNED 0.434*** 3.880 2.04 0.430*** 4.770 1.33 0.188 1.290 2.1 0.242*** 2.180 1.23
Meetings -0.362*** -4.420 1.18 -0.329*** -4.180 1.09 0.112 1.050 1.23    
Meetings x FNED -0.009 -0.310 1.84    -0.013 -0.340 1.84    
Size 0.136*** 4.530 2.7 0.168*** 6.910 1.79 0.279*** 7.540 2.52 0.303*** 8.980 2.10
Pay Chairman 0.039 1.070 1.44          
Pay CEO       0.063 1.070 1.94    
Pay NED 0.738*** 7.180 1.9 0.784*** 8.200 1.65 0.166 1.190 2.1 0.227* 1.890 1.58
Surviovors 0.066 1.250 1.61    -0.094 -1.390 1.61 -0.102 -1.580 1.46
TSR 0.108 1.410 1.34    -0.206*** -2.110 1.33 -0.254*** -2.940 1.04
PE -0.005*** -2.320 1.43 -0.003* -1.790 1.13 -0.004 -1.370 1.44    
SD_ROA 0.706 1.410 1.22    0.644 1.000 1.22    
Post_07 0.003 0.070 1.16 -0.061 -1.090 1.15
Adj R2 0.464     0.464     0.279     0.282    
F-Stat. 22.07***   43.22***   10.43***   29.91***   
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Figure 1. Annual Distribution of Board Variables.  
  
The chart illustrates the annual distribution of the number of board meetings on the 
right-hand scale, and, on the left hand vertical scale, the proportion of non-executive 
directors (%NED), foreign non-executive directors (%FNED), and foreign executive 
directors (%FED). The sample includes 241 UK firms with full disclosure of 
meetings and other relevant data, over the period 1999 to 2012, resulting in 1716 
firm-year observations. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of board composition by board meetings. 
  
The chart  illustrates the distribution of the mean board size on the  left hand vertical scale, 
and  on  the  right‐hand  vertical  scale,  the  proportion  of  non‐executive  directors  (%NED), 
foreign  non‐executive  directors  (%FNED),  foreign  executive  directors  (%FED),  total 
shareholder returns (TSR), and the standard deviation of Return on Assets (SD ROA) by board 
meetings deciles. The sample includes 241 UK firms with full disclosure of meetings and other 
relevant data, over the period 1999 to 2012, resulting in 1716 firm‐year observations. 
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